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PRE-DISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION IN
CONSUMER WARRANTIES:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT CONCLUDES
CORRECTLY FOR ALL THE
WRONG REASONS
Aaron K. Haar*
INTRODUCTION
On September 20, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued an opinion holding that federal law prohibited pre-dispute bind-
ing arbitration in consumer warranties.1 The opinion created a split among the
U.S. Courts of Appeals.2 Not nine months later, on April 11, 2012, the same
Ninth Circuit panel withdrew its opinion sua sponte, stripping the decision of
any precedential value and avoiding the disagreement among the circuits.3
The apex of the issue in Kolev v. Euromotors West/Auto Gallery con-
cerned the purported conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA).4 On one side, the FAA5 has
been interpreted to encompass a national policy favoring arbitration over litiga-
tion.6 On the other, the MMWA set consumer protection standards for warran-
ties covering consumer products.7 The conflict between the two statutes arises
in the remedies section of the MMWA. There, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)—the agency charged with overseeing the MMWA—appears to have
interpreted the statute to preclude binding arbitration in consumer warranties.8
The subsequent debate pit courts finding that the strong national policy behind
the FAA prevailed against courts concluding that the FTC had authority to
bolster the consumer-protection policy underlying the MMWA.
* J.D. Candidate 2013, William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I would like to thank Professor Jean Sternlight for her ideas and suggestions. I would
also like to thank Kendra Kisling for her suggestions, edits, and support.
1 See Kolev v. Euromotors W./Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion
withdrawn, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012).
2 See, e.g., Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002); Walton
v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2002).
3 See Kolev, 676 F.3d 867, 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (order withdrawing opinion).
4 Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1029.
5 The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2012).
6 See, e.g., Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (noting that the
FAA establishes “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
7 The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12 (2012).
8 See 40 Fed. Reg. 60,190, 60,210 (1975).
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Roughly half of interpreting courts have found that the FAA policy favor-
ing arbitration outweighed the FTC’s authority to preclude such arbitration.9
The others have found that the FTC was due deference in its interpretation
forbidding arbitration in consumer warranties.10 Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Kolev, only two U.S. Courts of Appeals had considered the issue in
published opinions. Both found that the FAA prevailed and that the FTC could
not prohibit binding arbitration in warranties.11
The facts of Kolev are as follows: Diana Kolev purchased a “pre-owned”
Porsche from a dealership in Southern California.12 Thereafter, the vehicle
began experiencing serious mechanical problems.13 The dealership refused to
make appropriate repairs and declined to honor Ms. Kolev’s warranty although
the vehicle was still within the warranty period.14 When she filed suit for
breach of warranty under federal and California law, the dealership filed a
motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the binding arbitration clause included
in its sales agreement.15 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California granted the motion, and Ms. Kolev was required to arbitrate her
claims.16
The arbitrator eventually resolved most of the claims in the dealership’s
favor, and the district court later confirmed the award.17 Ms. Kolev then
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.18 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the arbitrator’s decision on grounds that the MMWA precluded
pre-dispute binding arbitration in consumer warranties and remanded the case
back to the district court.19
Although state courts and federal district courts were already divided over
the issue, the Ninth Circuit’s decision created a circuit split that made Supreme
Court review much more likely; that is, until the Ninth Circuit panel withdrew
its opinion. In its brief withdrawal order, the panel vacated submission of the
case to the lower court pending a decision by the California Supreme Court in
Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co.20
The Sanchez case, like Kolev, evaluated the arbitration agreement in a
commonly used auto sales agreement but applied state law instead of federal
law. In the California Court of Appeals, the Sanchez Court found the arbitration
9 See cases cited infra notes 184–92.
10 See cases cited infra notes 180–83.
11 See Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002); Walton v.
Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2002).
12 Kolev v. Euromotors W./Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion
withdrawn, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1031.
20 Kolev, 676 F.3d at 867 (order withdrawing opinion). At the time the Ninth Circuit panel
withdrew its Kolev decision, the parties both had petitions for rehearing and petitions for
rehearing en banc pending.
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clause unconscionable.21 The California Supreme Court granted the petition for
review in Sanchez to determine whether the FAA preempts state law concern-
ing unconscionability of certain arbitration provisions in light of AT&T Mobil-
ity LLC v. Concepcion.22 At the time this Note went to print, the California
Supreme Court had not yet issued an opinion in Sanchez.
The California Supreme Court has stayed several cases pending the out-
come of Sanchez.23 Sanchez and most of these other cases share a common
arbitration provision24—the same arbitration provision at issue in Kolev.25 Sev-
eral state and federal cases in California previously found the arbitration clause
in this sales agreement unconscionable.26 Thus, by tying the outcome in Kolev
to state law, the Ninth Circuit panel was likely trying to avoid review en banc
or by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Scholarship on the interaction between the MMWA and the FAA has gen-
erally either agreed that the FAA supersedes the FTC’s interpretation27 or
argued that courts should defer to the FTC for consumer protection purposes.28
21 Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 41 (2011) review granted and
opinion superseded, 272 P.3d 976 (Cal. 2012).
22 News Release, Summary of Cases Accepted During the Week of March 19, 2012, JUD.
COUNCIL CAL. (Mar. 23, 2012), www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ws031912.pdf; see also
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
23 See, e.g., Goodridge v. KDF Auto. Grp., Inc., 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
review granted and opinion superseded, 290 P.3d 1116 (Cal. 2012); Mayers v. Volt Mgmt.
Corp., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted and opinion superseded,
278 P.3d 1167 (Cal. 2012); Buzenes v. Nuvell Fin. Servs., No. B221870, 2012 WL 208051
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2012), review granted (May 9, 2012) (unpublished).
24 Sanchez, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 23 n.2 review granted and opinion superseded, 272 P.3d
976 (Cal. 2012); Respondent’s Brief at 8, Goodridge v. KDF Auto. Grp., Inc., 147 Cal. Rptr.
3d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (No. D060269), 2012 WL 478376; Answer to Petition for
Review at 4, Buzenes v. Nuvell Fin. Servs., 2012 WL 1345014 (Cal. Ct. App.) (No.
S200376).
25 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 10, Kolev v. Euromotors W./Auto Gallery, 2010 WL
4470826 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-55963).
26 See, e.g., Natalini v. Import Motors, Inc., No. A133236, 2013 WL 427909, at *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 5, 2013); Fisher v. DCH Temecula Imports LLC, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24, 25 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2010); see also Lau v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940 MEJ, 2012
WL 370557, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012); Smith v. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc., No.
09CV1076 DMS (BLM), 2012 WL 834784, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012); Trompeter v.
Ally Fin., Inc., No. C 12-00392 CW, 2012 WL 1980894, at *4, *7 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012).
But see Flores v. W. Covina Auto Grp., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 481, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
27 See, e.g., Katherine R. Guerin, Clash of the Federal Titans: The Federal Arbitration Act
vs. the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Will the Consumer Win or Lose?, 13 LOY. CON-
SUMER L. REV. 4, 31 (2001) (arguing that the FAA likely supersedes the MMWA but that
consumers are less protected this way); Andrew P. Lamis, The New Age of Artificial Legal
Reasoning as Reflected in the Judicial Treatment of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Federal
Arbitration Act, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 173, 181–84 (2003); Katie Wiechens, Com-
ment, Arbitrating Consumer Claims Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1459, 1461 (2001).
28 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Grossberg, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, The Federal Arbi-
tration Act, and the Future of Consumer Protection, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 687 (2008);
Mace E. Gunter, Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The Magnuson-Moss Act and
Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REV. 1483, 1486 (2000); Daniel G.
Lloyd, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act v. the Federal Arbitration Act: The Quintessential
Chevron Case, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 5 (2003).
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Others propose changes to the language of the MMWA to ensure greater con-
sumer protection.29
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s decision, pre-withdrawal, was
correct when it found that the MMWA precluded binding arbitration—but not
for the reasons given by the Ninth Circuit, the Federal Trade Commission,
other courts, and previously published law review articles. This Note suggests
that the language of the FTC’s regulations, along with arguments proffered by
courts defending that interpretation, has ultimately been the FTC’s undoing on
the issue. If the FTC and its supporting courts had buttressed the arbitration
prohibition with different reasoning, the circuit split and the Ninth Circuit’s
subsequent withdrawal could have been avoided—and the FTC’s interpretation
preserved.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the FAA and the U.S. Supreme
Court’s evolving interpretation of the statute. Part II discusses the history of the
MMWA, Congress’s intent when it passed the MMWA, and the FTC’s inter-
pretation of the MMWA. Part III elaborates on the circuit split that culminated
in the Ninth Circuit’s decision and subsequent withdrawal of Kolev v.
Euromotors West/Auto Gallery. It then outlines Kolev’s majority and dissenting
opinions. Part IV evaluates the FTC’s (and courts’) unclear language and faulty
reasoning underlying the prohibition on pre-dispute binding arbitration in con-
sumer warranties. This section then makes suggested arguments that might
have been more successful in preserving the FTC’s interpretation. Finally, the
Note concludes by injecting these suggested arguments into the remainder of
the Ninth Circuit’s original decision.
I. HISTORY OF THE FAA AND THE SUPREME COURT’S
EVOLVING INTERPRETATION
A. History of the FAA
Arbitration’s roots are traceable to early civilization where processes were
formulated to quickly and efficiently dispose of private disputes.30 Various
communities, including merchant and trade groups, developed their own self-
contained systems “for adjudicating disputes in accordance with local norms,
standards, and rules.”31 As the prevalence of arbitration expanded, courts began
to view arbitration as a threat to their jurisdiction.32 In 1609, Lord Coke created
the “revocability doctrine,” which stated that parties were free to revoke the
power of an arbitrator at any time prior to the issuance of an award.33 Thereaf-
ter, English courts became increasingly hostile toward arbitration and, in 1746,
29 Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 631 (2008).
30 Amy J. Schmitz, Arbitration Ambush in a Policy Polemic, 3 PENN ST. Y.B. ON ARB. &
MEDIATION 52, 57 (2011) [hereinafter Schmitz, Arbitration Ambush].
31 Id.
32 Id. at 58.
33 Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (K.B.) 598 n.A; 8 Co. Rep. 80 a. See also Earl S.
Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 138
(1934).
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first articulated what became known as the “ouster” doctrine.34 Under the
ouster doctrine, parties could not “oust” a court’s jurisdiction by contract.35
Despite this judicial backlash, the use of arbitration remained popular
among business communities because “[m]erchant groups valued arbitrators’
specialized understanding of commercial issues and industry norms, and infor-
mal procedures that fostered continuing business relationships.”36 The New
York Chamber of Commerce, for instance, implemented an arbitration system
immediately upon its founding in 1768.37 During the American Revolutionary
War, while public courts were shuttered, the Chamber continued to operate its
independent arbitration system.38
At the turn of the 20th century, businesses were booming and the court
systems faced an increasingly demanding workload.39 Commercial groups
started lobbying for the enforceability of arbitration clauses at both the state
and federal levels.40 In 1920, the State of New York passed a law that enforced
arbitration clauses in maritime contracts.41 That same year, the American Bar
Association officially reported its support of commercial arbitration42 and, in
1922, produced a draft federal arbitration statute.43
Senator Thomas Sterling of South Dakota and Representative Ogden Mills
of New York, introduced the ABA’s proposed arbitration statute in 1922, enti-
34 Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.); 1 Wils. K.B. 129 (first introducing the
ouster doctrine); see also Wolaver, supra note 33, at 139 (discussing ouster).
35 Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 599 (1997).
36 Schmitz, Arbitration Ambush, supra note 30, at 58.
37 Id. at 57.
38 Id. at 57–58.
39 Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s Prefer-
ence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 645 (1996).
40 Id.
41 See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 118–19 (1924) (discussing The New
York Arbitration Law enacted April 19, 1920 (§ 275 (Consol. 1920)), and amended March 1,
1921 (§ 14 (Consol. 1921)). Julius Cohen, general counsel of the New York State Chamber
of Commerce, and Charles Bernheimer, chair of the Chamber’s arbitration committee, are
credited with successfully championing the cause of arbitration—first in New York, then
nationally. Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created
a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 101–02
(2006) [hereinafter Moses, Statutory Misconstruction]. “Bernheimer organized the support
of the national business organizations. Cohen spearheaded the legal case.” Id. at 102.
42 Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 281, 285 (2002).
43 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 645–46. “The original [FAA] was drafted, principally by
Julius Cohen, on the model of the New York statute.” Moses, Statutory Misconstruction,
supra note 41, at 102. In a brief submitted to Congress, and later included in the congres-
sional record, Cohen argued that “since an arbitration agreement is essentially a business
contract, it should be treated the same as other business contracts.” Id. at 103–04 (citing
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the
J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16, 33–41 (1924) (statement of Julius
Cohen)). Cohen claimed that giving legal effect to arbitration agreements would help eradi-
cate three policy “evils”: “(1) long delays caused by congested courts and excessive motion
practice, (2) the expense of litigation, and (3) the failure through litigation to reach a deci-
sion regarded as just.” Id. at 103. Cohen argued that Congress’s authority to pass the arbitra-
tion legislation was not dependent on the Commerce Clause or admiralty power, but on the
power of Congress “to establish and control inferior Federal Courts.” Id. at 108.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ310.txt unknown Seq: 6 17-JUN-13 10:35
Spring 2013] PRE-DISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION 909
tled “A bill to make valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements for
arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transactions or com-
merce among the States or Territories or with foreign nations.”44 When reintro-
duced in 1923, after failing in committee the prior year,45 the bill excluded
“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”46 Apparently, this exclu-
sion was a prominent consideration in passing the law because members of
Congress expressed concern that dominant business interests might use arbitra-
tion to take advantage of weaker parties.47 Representative Mills assured his
fellow Congress members that the purpose of the bill was simply to make arbi-
tration clauses enforceable just as other parts of a contract were enforceable.48
The FAA passed in both the House and the Senate without a single oppos-
ing vote.49 Calvin Coolidge eventually signed the FAA into law on February
12, 1925.50 The core of the FAA states:
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such con-
tract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.51
Prior to the passage of the FAA, American courts generally followed the
English standard of allowing willing parties to submit their dispute to arbitra-
tion, but refused to force a party to arbitrate if it changed its mind after entering
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.52 The FAA, thus, required courts to
enforce such contractual agreements. The Supreme Court’s initial hesitance to
44 S. 4214, 67th Cong., 64 CONG. REC. 732 (1922); H.R. 13522, 67th Cong., 64 CONG. REC.
797 (1922).
45 See Paul Turner, Preemption: The United States Arbitration Act, the Manifest Disregard
of the Law Test for Vacating an Arbitration Award, and State Courts, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 519,
538 (1999) (citing Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings on S. 1005 &
H.R. 646 Before the Joint Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, United States Senate and
House of Representatives, 68th Cong. 6 (1924) (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chair-
man, Comm. on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of N.Y.).
46 S. 1005, 68th Cong. (1923); H.R. 646, 68th Cong. (1923); Arbitration of Interstate Com-
mercial Disputes, Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the
Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. (1924). Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce,
sent a letter to Congress that was eventually included in both the 1923 Hearings and the 1924
Joint Hearings, emphasizing that the arbitration bill should not apply to employee contracts
and suggesting language to clarify the exclusion. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra
note 41, at 101 n.16, 105–06 & n.40 (citing Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214
Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9, 14 (1923) & Arbitration
of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of
Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16, 21 (1924)). Hoover’s suggested language was
implemented, nearly verbatim, into the final Act. Id.
47 Feingold, supra note 42, at 286.
48 65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924) (comments of Rep. Mills).
49 Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 41, at 110.
50 Feingold, supra note 42, at 284.
51 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
52 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 644–45.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ310.txt unknown Seq: 7 17-JUN-13 10:35
910 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:904
empower the FAA eventually gave way to a relationship marked by fondness
and active promotion.53
B. The Supreme Court’s Evolving Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration
Act
The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has evolved since the FAA
first became law.54 Professor Jean Sternlight has recognized the evolutionary
lifespan of the FAA as three discernible periods: (1) 1925–1966, (2)
1967–1982, and (3) 1983–Present.55 The basis of these periods is the develop-
ment of certain judicial policies surrounding the FAA that Professor Sternlight
refers to as “myths.”56 The first myth she asserts developed over these periods
is that “commercial arbitration served a substantial public purpose and should
be favored regardless of the parties’ intentions.”57 Professor Sternlight also
articulates “the dual myths that the FAA applies to actions brought in state
court and that the FAA prohibits states from enacting legislation hostile to arbi-
tration.”58 Lastly, she discerns the myth that “arbitration is as appropriate for
virtually all disputes as is litigation.”59
1. The First Evolutionary Period
Professor Sternlight calls the first period, 1925–1966, “the period of origi-
nal intent.”60 At the passage of the FAA, it appears Congress intended the FAA
to apply only to transactions between merchants of approximately equal bar-
gaining power.61 Very few large merchants transacted with individual consum-
ers at the time, and even fewer involved interstate commerce.62 When a senator
voiced concern during a subcommittee hearing that arbitration clauses may be
“offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees,” the
bill’s supporters reassured him that the bill was not intended to apply in those
situations.63
53 Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial
Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385, 392–93 (2007).
54 One expert comments:
It is an open secret that the national policy favoring arbitration is a judges’ policy, not the policy
of Congress in enacting the statute, and everyone knows what only the occasional dissenter and
numerous academic critics claim: that “the [Supreme] Court has abandoned all pretense of ascer-
taining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice
of its own creation.”
David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State
Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 628 (2004).
55 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 644, 653, 660.
56 Id. at 644.
57 Id. at 660.
58 Id. at 664.
59 Id. at 672.
60 Id. at 644.
61 Id. at 647; see also Margaret L. Moses, Privatized “Justice”, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535,
536 (2005).
62 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 647.
63 Id. (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9–11 (1923)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ310.txt unknown Seq: 8 17-JUN-13 10:35
Spring 2013] PRE-DISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION 911
The Supreme Court’s first case regarding the scope of the FAA followed
this general understanding. Wilko v. Swan involved an action by a customer
against a securities brokerage firm for misrepresentation in a sale of securi-
ties.64 In a conflict between the FAA and the Securities Act of 1933, which was
intended to protect investors’ rights, the Court avoided the arbitration agree-
ment on grounds investor protections were less effective in arbitration than in
judicial settings.65
Also during this time, it appears the FAA was generally understood to
apply only in federal court.66 Although Erie Railroad v. Tompkins67 had yet to
be decided, the Supreme Court’s holding in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus68
strongly implied that the FAA was procedural, which would eventually make
the FAA applicable only in federal court.69 Of the numerous state cases that
considered application of the FAA during this period, only one held that the
FAA superseded state arbitration law.70
After Erie, however, the Court heard a diversity case where it determined
that, although the FAA appeared procedural, its application would likely affect
the outcome of a case.71 Evaluating the FAA based on the “outcome determina-
tive test” set out in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York,72 the Court found
that the FAA was actually substantive law, explaining that choosing arbitration
over litigation could “make a radical difference in ultimate result.”73 Thus, fed-
eral courts were further limited in their use of the FAA because they now had
to defer to state arbitration law in diversity cases.74
64 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 428–29 (1953).
65 Id. at 438.
66 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 649. “In 1925, when the Act was considered and enacted, the
American notions of interstate commerce were more restrained. Hence, the enacting Con-
gress might even have thought it had no power to dictate arbitration law in state courts.”
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in Dis-
pute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEV. L.J. 305, 330
(2002/2003). Furthermore, the FAA preceded the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and the pro-
mulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, so Congress may not have even
been able to “visualize a federal law that controlled state procedure regarding arbitrability at
a time when a state’s rules of procedure generally dictated procedure for the federal courts
located in that state.” Id. But see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexam-
ining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101,
105 (2002) (“Materials submitted to Congress by the principal drafter of the FAA, Julius
Henry Cohen, provide strong evidence that the FAA was intended to apply in state court.”).
67 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (creating legal doctrine requiring federal
courts with diversity jurisdiction to apply substantive state law and procedural federal law).
68 Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
69 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 650 & n.65.
70 IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 127–30 (1992) (citing French v. Petrinovic, 54 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App.
Term 1945); Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 43 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1950);
Parsons & Whittemore, Inc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Nordstjernan, 143 N.Y.S.2d 74 (App.
Term 1955) (per curiam), aff’d, 145 N.Y.S.2d 466 (App. Div. 1955); In re Omnium Freight-
ing Corp., 185 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Deep S. Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Corp., 328
S.W.2d 897, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)).
71 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202–03 (1956).
72 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
73 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203.
74 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 651.
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2. The Second Evolutionary Period
The second evolutionary period Professor Sternlight recognized ranges
from 1967 to 1982.75 She refers to this time as the period when the “seeds of
myths are planted.”76 This period marked a shift of the Supreme Court focusing
more on social policy than individual consent in determining applicability of
the FAA.77 One social policy, introduced by the dissent in Barrentine v. Arkan-
sas-Best Freight,78 eventually became particularly influential in Supreme Court
jurisprudence: the reduction of court backlogs and resolution of disputes with
greater efficiency.79
In 1967, the Court decided Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manu-
facturing Co.,80 which affirmed that the FAA was categorically grounded in
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.81 Although Prima Paint was a diversity
case, the Court’s conclusion that the FAA was valid substantive federal law led
to application of the FAA in state court under the Supremacy Clause.82 Recog-
nizing the implications of the holding, Justice Black, joined by Justices Stewart
and Douglas, penned a vigorous dissent that exceeded the majority opinion in
length.83
Prima Paint also introduced the concept that became known as the “sepa-
rability doctrine.”84 Under the separability doctrine, the arbitration clause, like
all other contract clauses, is separable from the rest of the contract.85 Courts,
then, must review any direct challenges to arbitration clauses, while all other
contractual challenges must be heard by an arbitrator.86
The Court’s arbitration jurisprudence also underwent a transition in this
second period, from the Court emphasizing the significant differences between
arbitration and litigation to the Court determining that a substantial difference
may exist depending on the circumstances.87 In several labor cases, the Court
75 Id. at 653.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight, 450 U.S. 728, 746 (1981) (Burger, C.J. & Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
79 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 656.
80 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). One commentator
called Prima Paint “the first major misstep in interpreting the FAA.” See Moses, Statutory
Misconstruction, supra note 41, at 100.
81 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
82 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 656–57.
Once the Court essentially severed the FAA from its historical context by declaring it to be
a substantive statute applicable in both state and federal court, it rarely looked back at the legisla-
tive history. Moreover, the justices not only ignored the historic context but also ignored or
recast earlier precedent that was consistent with the intent of the enacting Congress. Instead, the
Court relied on its own recently created precedent to entirely rewrite the statute and create an
edifice of its own design.
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 41, at 131–32.
83 See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 407.
84 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 656–57 & n.105.
85 See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403–04.
86 Id.
87 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 658–59.
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found that arbitration was significantly different from litigation.88 In other
cases, the Court gradually began to find that arbitration could produce a deci-
sion that was just as good as a decision produced by litigation.89
3. The Third Evolutionary Period
Professor Sternlight refers to the third period, 1983–Present, as the period
when “the myths fully develop.”90 In 1983, the Court decided Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction.91 There, the Court first
announced a “federal policy favoring arbitration.”92 Though the Court stated no
rationale for favoring arbitration, it appears the Court was motivated by its
desire to conserve judicial resources.93
During this period, the Court became even less concerned with the inten-
tion of the parties.94 In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., the Court held that although “the parties’ intentions control,” a party’s
“intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.”95 Although
the Court wrote subsequent decisions emphasizing consent,96 its decision in
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto97 ultimately prohibited state laws seek-
ing to limit arbitration agreements even if the purpose was to ensure a knowing
choice of arbitration.98
Professor Sternlight notes that, during this period, the Supreme Court
articulated “the dual myths that the FAA applies to actions brought in state
court and that the FAA prohibits states from enacting legislation hostile to arbi-
tration.”99 In Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court overruled the California
Supreme Court’s interpretation that claims under a particular California statute
88 Id. at 659 (citing McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barren-
tine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974)).
89 Id. at 659–60 (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403–04; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417
U.S. 506 (1974)).
90 Id. at 660.
91 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
92 Id. at 24–25 (emphasis added).
[N]othing in the legislative history suggests a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. The
1925 Congress never indicated in the slightest way that arbitration was to be favored over judi-
cial resolution of disputes. It simply made arbitration of commercial and maritime agreements
enforceable in federal court because, until 1925, such agreements had essentially been revocable
at will by the parties.
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 41, at 123.
93 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 660–61.
94 Id. at 662.
95 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
96 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
477–79 (1989) (holding that parties could choose to be governed by state law rather than the
FAA as long as the state law did not conflict with the FAA); see also Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) (ruling in favor of the consumer on
the basis that he was likely unaware of the effect of the arbitration clause); First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944–45 (1995) (holding that the parties may decide
whether the court or an arbitrator will resolve questions of arbitrability).
97 Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
98 Id. at 687; Sternlight, supra note 39, at 663.
99 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 664.
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could only be resolved through litigation and not through arbitration.100 The
Court based its reasoning on the Commerce Clause and a questionable reading
of the FAA’s legislative history.101 Shortly thereafter, in Perry v. Thomas, the
Court invalidated part of another California statute that specifically exempted
certain employment issues from arbitration.102
After the Court granted certiorari in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dob-
son,103 twenty state attorneys general submitted a joint amicus brief asking the
Court to overturn Southland on grounds that states should have the power to
control their own court proceedings.104 The attorneys general argued that states
should be allowed to protect “consumers and others of unequal bargaining
power or information.”105 The Court disagreed, however, because Southland—
then a decade-old precedent—was “now well-established law.”106
In Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, the Court struck down a Montana law
that required arbitration clauses to be “typed in underlined capital letters on the
first page of the contract.”107 The Court made clear that the FAA imposed the
requirement that arbitration clauses be treated on the same footing as any other
contractual provision.108 Thus, any state law that singled out arbitration for
special treatment was inherently void under the FAA.109
Another feature of this third period, Sternlight explains, is that the Court
gradually eroded the public policy exception it created in Wilko.110 In Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, a case similar to Wilko, the Court
compelled arbitration against a consumer with claims against his brokerage
firm under RICO and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.111 In finding that
arbitration was an adequate substitute to litigation, the Court stated that its
holding in Wilko was based on a mistrust of arbitration that was “difficult to
square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time.”112
100 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). “[T]he FAA was never described in
the legislative history as applying to any claims other than contract and maritime claims.”
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 41, at 139.
101 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 664.
102 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
103 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
104 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 665 & n.156.
105 Id. at 665 n.156 (quoting Brief Amici Curiae for the Attorneys General in Support of
Petitioners, Terminix, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (No. 93-1001)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
106 Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272.
107
  Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (quoting MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108 Id. at 687. Interestingly, by striking down the Montana law that required prominence of
arbitration clauses within a contract, the court actually failed to place arbitration clauses “on
the same footing as other contracts.” Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 41, at
136. States frequently require certain contractual provisions to be conspicuous—“an attempt
to exclude the implied warranty of merchantability must be conspicuous.” Id. “If a state law
cannot require that a provision containing an arbitration clause be conspicuous, it means the
arbitration clause is not on the same footing as other provisions.” Id.
109 Doctor’s Associates, 517 U.S. at 687.
110 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 669.
111 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).
112 Id. at 229, 233.
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The Court noted, however, that Congress could explicitly preclude arbitration
under federal statute just as with any other statutory directive.113
Though not explicitly overturning Wilko, McMahon served as a forecast
for Wilko’s eventual overruling two years later in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.114 There, the majority explicitly overruled
Wilko because of the case’s “judicial hostility to arbitration.”115
Two years later, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court
compelled arbitration in a claim arising under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).116 In Gilmer, an employee was required to register
as a securities representative as a condition of his employment.117 As a require-
ment of registration, the employee was subject to an arbitration agreement
when mandated by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange.118 The Court
rejected the claim that compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims would be con-
trary to public policy.119 It held that the statute would “continue to serve both
its remedial and deterrent function” as long as the complainant was able to have
his claims heard in some forum.120
Therein lay yet another myth—that “arbitration is as appropriate for virtu-
ally all disputes as is litigation.”121 This myth was first annunciated in Mitsub-
ishi Motors.122 The Court stated that submitting a claim to arbitration merely
traded “the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”123 The Court discarded a
number of anti-arbitration arguments and concluded that arbitrators are capable
of handling complex issues,124 that arbitrators are not inherently biased,125 and
that choosing arbitration does not forego any substantive rights.126 Professor
Sternlight notes that these assertions, which have been reiterated in subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, are not supported by any empirical data and do not
address the issue of extreme imbalances of power.127
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court expanded the scope of the
FAA to cover nearly all employment contracts.128 The Court reasoned that the
113 Id. at 226.
114 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480–81 (1989).
115 Id. at 480 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978,
985 (2d Cir. 1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
117 Id. at 23.
118 Id. New York Stock Exchange Rule 347 required arbitration of any controversy arising
out of a registered representative’s employment. Id.
119 Id. at 27.
120 Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 672.
122 Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628; Sternlight, supra note 39, at 672.
123 Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
124 Id. at 633.
125 Id. at 634.
126 Id. at 628.
127 Sternlight, supra note 39, at 673.
128 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). The ruling prompted one
expert to refer to the case as the Supreme Court’s “high water mark of statutory misinterpre-
tation[,]” Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 41, at 146, and another to observe
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employment contracts excluded by the FAA—“contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce”129—were limited to those concerning transportation-
related employees.130
More recent cases have expanded the scope of the FAA even further. The
Court in Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, building on Prima Paint, held that parties
must submit to arbitration even when a party directly challenges the arbitration
agreement unless the challenge focused specifically on the delegation clause
within the agreement that granted the arbitrator jurisdiction.131 And in Preston
v. Ferrer, the Court held that the FAA required arbitration even before state-
law-provided administrative resolution.132
Then, in a dispute between sophisticated business entities, the Court, in
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., held that a complainant
may not be granted class status without an explicit provision for resolution of
class disputes within the arbitration agreement.133 Thereafter, the Court in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion held that the FAA preempted a state’s judi-
cial rule holding class arbitration waivers in consumer adhesion contracts
unconscionable.134 By so holding, the Court made it possible for corporations
with superior bargaining power to completely eliminate any exposure to class
action liability.135
that “the Court seems to employ whatever methodology results in a victory for the party
drafting the arbitration agreement” Stempel, supra note 66, at 332.
129 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
130 Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 109. The fact that the language of the statute only
excluded these “transportation-related” employees is most likely due to the more restrained
view of Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce when the FAA came about. Cf.
Stempel, supra note 66, at 330 (“In 1925, when the Act was considered and enacted, the
American notions of interstate commerce were more restrained.”). Based on the Act’s legis-
lative history concerning implementation of the FAA in employment contracts, Congress
probably would have excluded all employment contracts if it actually thought it had the
authority to regulate them in the first place. See S. 1005, 68th Cong. (1924); H.R. 646, 68th
Cong. (1925); Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. (1924).
131 See Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010).
132 Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008).
133 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
134 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). The Court issued
this opinion despite Congress’s original understanding that the FAA would not apply to
contracts of adhesion. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on
S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 15
(1924) (statement of Mr. Cohen, General Counsel for the New York State Chamber of
Commerce).
135 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Supreme Court Case Could End Class-Action Suits, S.F.
CHRON. (Nov. 7, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/Supreme-Court-
case-could-end-class-action-suits-3246898.php. “Today’s statute—which has been construed
to preempt state law, eliminate the requirement of consent to arbitration, permit arbitration of
statutory rights, and remove the jury trial right from citizens without their knowledge or
consent—is a statute that would not likely have commanded a single vote in the 1925 Con-
gress.” Moses, Statutory Misconstruction, supra note 41, at 99–100.
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II. HISTORY OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT, CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT, AND THE FTC’S INTERPRETATION
A. History of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
In response to an increase in complaints that manufacturers and retailers
were failing to honor warranties, failing to cure product defects, and refusing to
make repairs, President Lyndon Johnson assembled a task force in 1968 for the
purpose of evaluating appliance warranties and service.136 After studying more
than 200 warranties over the next year, the task force reported that warranties
were rampant with ambiguous language, including provisions that disclaimed
any potential liability arising under implied warranty.137
Around the same time, the FTC launched an investigation into automobile
warranties.138 The FTC concluded that vehicle quality was substandard and
warranty coverage was deficient.139 Furthermore, the FTC found that the auto
industry’s response to decreasing quality control was simply to bury its head in
the sand.140 The state of the auto industry led the FTC to propose comprehen-
sive legislation to address the public safety concerns posed by these burgeoning
problems.141
In 1967, Senators Warren Magnuson of Washington and Carl Hayden of
Arizona introduced separate legislation covering home appliances and automo-
biles.142 For the next eight years, Congress deliberated over the appropriate
contents of a warranty-related statute.143 Simultaneously with warranty deliber-
ations, Congress considered a bill to expand the power of the FTC.144 The
warranty bill and the FTC reform legislation were combined in 1971.145 In
1972, Senator Norris Cotton of New Hampshire suggested an amendment to
refer to the bill by the short title “Magnuson-Moss Act.”146 The name
“Magnuson” clearly referred to Senator Warren Magnuson, but Senator Cotton
proposed the ambiguous “Moss” as a political “ace in the hole”—both Senator
Frank Moss of Utah and Representative John Moss of California were active
supporters of the bill.147
On December 18, 1974, the Senate adopted the final version of the
“Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act”
by a vote of 70–5.148 The next day, the House followed suit by voice vote.149
136 Christopher Smith, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Turning the Tables on Caveat
Emptor, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 391, 393 (1977).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 393–94.
142 Id. at 395.
143 2 BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES § 14:2,
at 14-5 (2010).
144 Id. at 14-8.
145 Id.
146 Smith, supra note 136, at 391 n.2.
147 Id.; see also 117 CONG. REC. 39,685 (1971).
148 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 143, at 14-8–14-9.
149 Id. at 14-9.
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President Gerald Ford signed the Act into law on January 4, 1975,150 to take
effect July 4, 1975.151
B. Congressional Intent and the MMWA
The stated purpose of the MMWA is three-fold: (1) “to improve the ade-
quacy of information available to consumers,” (2) to “prevent deception,” and
(3) to “improve competition in the marketing of consumer products.”152 In
seeking to accomplish these goals, Congress required “full and conspicuous
disclosure of terms and conditions” of warranties under the MMWA.153 The
MMWA also required the warrantor to make the terms of a warranty available
to the consumer prior to a sale.154 Congress granted the FTC authority to estab-
lish rules concerning the “manner and form” of information presented in a
warranty.155
The MMWA set the federal minimum standards for warranties.156 The
MMWA does not require that sales of consumer products be accompanied by a
warranty.157 But, when warrantors do provide a warranty, they must “clearly
and conspicuously designate” to what extent it fulfills these federal minimum
standards by labeling the warranty as “full” or “limited.”158
In the remedies section of the MMWA, Congress declared its policy “to
encourage warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are
fairly and expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mecha-
nisms.”159 Congress adopted this policy because it found consumers were often
denied a remedy under a warranty simply because adjudication was cost pro-
hibitive.160 Though the MMWA does not define “informal dispute settlement
mechanisms,” it does grant the FTC authority to establish minimum require-
ments for informal dispute settlement procedures.161 The Act states that “war-
rantors may establish an informal dispute settlement procedure” that conforms
to the FTC’s requirements.162
If the warrantor establishes a conforming procedure and includes in the
written warranty “that the consumer [must] resort to such procedure before pur-
suing any legal remedy under this section,” the Act grants the warrantor a num-
ber of benefits in return.163 By following this prescribed route, the MMWA
protects the warrantor from a civil action until the consumer has resorted to the
150 Id.
151 Smith, supra note 136, at 395.
152 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (2012).
153 Id.
154 Id. § 2302(b)(1)(A).
155 Id. § 2302(b)(1)(B).
156 Id. § 2304.
157 Id. § 2302(b)(2).
158 Id. § 2303(a)(1)–(2).
159 Id. § 2310(a)(1).
160 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 27 (1974).
161 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2). The FTC-promulgated rules for informal dispute settlement pro-
cedures, requiring that the details of the procedure be included in the warranty. 16 C.F.R.
§ 701.3(a)(6) (2012).
162 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (emphasis added).
163 Id.
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procedure.164 Further, the MMWA protects the warrantor from a class action
until the named plaintiffs exhaust their options under the procedure.165 The
intended result is fair and expedient resolution of warranty claims and lower
costs for both warrantors and consumers.166
C. The Federal Trade Commission’s Interpretation of the MMWA
Congress granted the FTC express authority to promulgate rules for imple-
mentation of the MMWA167 and to prescribe rules for the statute’s informal
dispute settlement (“Mechanism”) procedures.168 The FTC published a policy
statement on June 18, 1975, to provide guidance during implementation of the
Act.169 Thereafter, mired in continual requests for advisory opinions, the Com-
mission published its full interpretations of the MMWA on July 13, 1977.170
These interpretations covered a wide range of issues in the MMWA, including
details of what must appear in a written warranty,171 details concerning warran-
tor obligations to provide consumers with warranty information prior to
purchase,172 and details concerning the minimum standards for Mechanism
procedures.173
The FTC focused on the remedies section of the MMWA in determining
that the Act precluded binding arbitration. It stated two reasons for such a con-
clusion. First, it found that Congress intended that “[s]ection 110 Mechanisms
not be legally binding.”174 Second, the Commission stated that it was not pre-
pared to implement guidelines for a system where consumers commit, at the
time of purchase, to resolving disputes in a non-judicial proceeding.175 The
FTC asserted its belief that such a system would not sufficiently protect
consumers.176
The fuzzy language of the regulations appears to only prohibit pre-dispute
binding arbitration agreements. The FTC stated that warrantors and consumers
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 See id. § 2310(a)(1).
167 Id. § 2312(c).
168 Id. § 2310(a)(2).
169 Final Action Concerning Review of Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,700 (Apr. 22, 1999) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 700).
170 Id. These interpretations eventually made their way to the Code of Federal Regulations
under 16 C.F.R. §§ 700–03 (2012).
171 16 C.F.R. § 701.
172 Id. § 702.
173 Id. § 703.
174 Rules, Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations Under Magnusson-Moss Warranty
Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,210 (Dec. 31, 1975) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 701). The House
Report supported this interpretation: “An adverse decision in any informal dispute settlement
proceeding would not be a bar to a civil action on the warranty involved in the proceeding.”
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 41 (1974). The statute itself fairly clearly establishes this fact as
well, requiring submission to the informal dispute settlement procedure before commencing
a civil or class action. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(C).
175 Rules, Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations Under Magnusson-Moss Warranty
Act, 40 Fed. Reg. at 60,210.
176 Id.
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were free to utilize binding arbitration after a Mechanism decision.177 It also
indicated that parties may agree to commence binding arbitration instead of
resorting to the Mechanism procedure if they find it more appropriate.178 How-
ever, the Commission concluded, “reference within the written warranty to any
binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the Act.”179 Thus, it
appears the FTC desired only to limit pre-dispute arbitration agreements, not
necessarily pre-Mechanism agreements.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE LAW AND KOLEV
A. A Short-Lived Circuit Split
State and federal courts are divided over whether the FTC could eliminate
pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements in warranties. State courts that have
followed the FTC’s interpretation include Maryland,180 South Carolina,181
Mississippi,182 and Virginia.183 Contrarily, state courts in Kansas,184 Indi-
ana,185 Illinois,186 Michigan,187 Ohio,188 Louisiana,189 Georgia,190 Texas,191
and Alabama192 have all rejected the FTC’s guidelines.
The federal court system has also experienced a good deal of dissonance
on the issue. In 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Ala-
bama followed the FTC’s interpretation,193 only to be overruled by a 2002
Eleventh Circuit decision.194 The Southern District of Mississippi deferred to
the FTC’s interpretation in 2000195 before the Fifth Circuit went the other
direction two years later.196 In the Fourth Circuit, both federal district courts in
177 Id. at 60,211.
178 Id.
179 Id. (emphasis added). The FTC revisited its interpretations of the MMWA again in 1999
and more clearly reaffirmed its commitment to “prohibit[ing] warrantors from including
binding arbitration clauses in their contracts . . . .” Final Action Concerning Review of
Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,708–09 (Apr. 22,
1999).
180 Koons Ford of Balt. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722, 737 (Md. 2007).
181 Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 673 (S.C. 2007).
182 Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So. 2d 529, 535 (Miss. 2002).
183 Philyaw v. Platinum Enters., Inc., No. CL00-236, 2001 WL 112107, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 9, 2001).
184 Hemphill v. Ford Motor Co., 206 P.3d 1, 12 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).
185 Walker v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 856 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
186 Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. 2004).
187 Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 677 N.W.2d 325 (Mich. 2004).
188 McDaniel v. Gateway Computer Corp., No. 04CA12, 2004 WL 2260497, at *3 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2004).
189 Howell v. Cappaert Manufactured Hous., Inc., 819 So. 2d 461, 464 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
190 Crawford v. Results Oriented, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 342 (Ga. 2001).
191 In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 491–92 (Tex. 2001).
192 S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (Ala. 2000).
193 Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530, 1539 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
194 Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002).
195 Raesly v. Grand Hous., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 562, 573 & n.17 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
196 Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2002).
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Virginia have complied with the FTC’s anti-arbitration guidelines.197 In the
Sixth Circuit, the federal district courts for the Northern District of Ohio198 and
the Eastern District of Michigan199 both followed the FTC’s interpretation in
2003 and 2004, respectively.
Ninth Circuit courts first considered the issue in 2004. A magistrate judge
in the District of Arizona issued an order compelling arbitration and rejecting
the FTC’s interpretation.200 The District of Oregon opted to follow the FTC’s
interpretation in 2008.201 Then, in September 2011, the Ninth Circuit panel in
Kolev v. Euromotors West/Auto Gallery split from the Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits by finding that the FTC was, in fact, due deference in its interpretation.202
The circuit split was short lived, however, because the Ninth Circuit panel
withdrew its decision in April 2012.203
The decisions considering the FTC’s interpretation of the MMWA contain
similar arguments on both sides of the issue. Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Rein-
hardt, writing for the majority in Kolev, cited to Chief Judge Carolyn King’s
Fifth Circuit dissent with marked approval throughout the decision.204 Simi-
larly, Judge N. Randy Smith’s dissent in Kolev closely tracks both the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuit majority opinions rejecting the FTC’s interpretation of the
MMWA.205
B. The Majority Decision in Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery
The majority in Kolev first looked to the MMWA to establish that Con-
gress delegated rulemaking authority under the statute.206 The court found this
authority in 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2), which granted the FTC authority to pre-
scribe rules for informal dispute settlement procedures.207 Judge Reinhardt then
applied the Chevron deference test to evaluate the FTC’s anti-arbitration
construction.208
197 Browne v. Kline Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 2002); Pitch-
ford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964 (W.D. Va. 2000).
198 Rickard v. Teynor’s Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 910, 921 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
199 Harnden v. Ford Motor Co., 408 F. Supp. 2d 300, 307 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
200 Order Compelling Arbitration, Dombrowski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 318 F. Supp. 2d 850,
850–51 (D. Ariz. 2004). The District of Arizona revisited the topic in 2009 and concluded
similarly. Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1137 (D. Ariz. 2009).
201 Breniser v. W. Recreational Vehicles, Inc., 2008 WL 5234528, at *6 (D. Or. 2008).
202 Kolev v. Euromotors W./Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1027–29 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion
withdrawn, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012).
203 Kolev v. Euromotors W./Auto Gallery, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012).
204 Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1028–29 (citing Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470,
480–92 (5th Cir. 2002)).
205 Id. at 1031 (Smith, J., dissenting). The main difference between the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits’ analyses is that the Fifth Circuit stopped after the first prong of the Chevron test,
holding that Congress had spoken directly to the issue through the FAA’s pro-arbitration
presumption, Walton, 298 F.3d at 478 & n.14, while the Eleventh Circuit avoided the FTC’s
interpretation with the second prong of the Chevron test by finding that the agency’s con-
struction was impermissible, Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1279 (11th Cir.
2002).
206 Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1025.
207 Id.
208 Id.
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Under the Chevron test, courts evaluate an agency’s interpretation of a
statute by applying a two-step approach.209 First, the court must determine
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”210 If
Congress’s intent is clear, the matter is concluded because the court and agency
must follow Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent.211 If the statute is
silent or ambiguous concerning that precise question, however, the court con-
tinues to the second step, where it must determine “whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”212
The Chevron Court stated that administrative oversight of congressionally
created programs “requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to
fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”213 In an explicit delega-
tion, Congress grants authority to an agency to explicate specific statutory pro-
visions by regulation.214 These regulations are controlling unless the court finds
them “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”215 Congress
may also grant implicit authority to an agency, wherein the court “may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable inter-
pretation made by the administrator of an agency.”216
In Kolev, the two-judge majority found that Congress had not directly spo-
ken to the question of whether parties may include pre-dispute binding arbitra-
tion clauses in warranties under the MMWA.217 Accordingly, the court shifted
its focus to the second prong of the Chevron test.
The court found three reasons why the FTC’s interpretation was a reasona-
ble construction of the statute. The first reason was that the FTC relied on
legislative history declaring that decisions of informal dispute settlement mech-
anisms may not be legally binding.218 The court pointed to the Subcommittee
Staff Report, which stated that consumers must be informed of their rights,
including their right to pursue litigation.219 The court reasoned that the report
appears to sympathize that the fate of aggrieved consumers rests with the war-
rantor and the warrantor’s willingness to abide by its promises.220
Second, the court found that Congress, in the MMWA, sought to address
“the extreme inequality in bargaining power that vendors wielded over consum-
ers by ‘providing consumers with access to reasonable and effective remedies’
for breaches of warranty, and by ‘provid[ing] the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) with means of better protecting consumers.’ ”221 The court pointed to
209 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
210 Id. at 842.
211 Id. at 842–43.
212 Id. at 843.
213 Id. (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
214 Id. at 843–44.
215 Id. at 844.
216 Id.
217 Kolev v. Euromotors W./Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011).
218 Id. at 1027 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,210 (Dec. 31, 1975)).
219 Id. (citing 120 CONG. REC. 31,318 (1974)).
220 Id.
221 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at [20, 29] (1974)). Note: The court, here, cites to
page 24 of the House Report, but that is incorrect.
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the FTC’s assertion that it did not believe it could adequately protect consumers
in a system that allowed warrantors to bind consumers to non-judicial proceed-
ings at the time of purchase.222 The court also cited the section of the House
Report affirming that the decision of a Mechanism “would not be a bar to a
civil action.”223
Third, the majority referred to Supreme Court precedent finding that “a
court may accord great weight to the long-standing interpretation placed on a
statute by an agency charged with its administration.”224 The court premised
this longevity-based deference on the proposition that it is unlikely an error
would persist for very long.225 The FTC promulgated its bar to pre-dispute
binding arbitration in 1975, shortly after Congress enacted the MMWA. Since
the FTC’s interpretation “has persisted for more than thirty-five years” and
“remains in effect to this day,” the court concluded that the agency’s construc-
tion was due strong deference.226
The court then addressed the argument that the FTC’s interpretation was
unreasonable based on multiple Supreme Court findings of a strong federal
policy favoring arbitration.227 First, the court found that this argument was con-
trary to two well-established standards of statutory construction.228 The first
standard—“that later enacted statutes take priority over older ones”—required
that the MMWA prevail over the FAA, which became law fifty-one years
before the MMWA.229 The second standard—“that more specific statutes con-
trol more general ones”—required that the consumer-warranty-specific
MMWA take priority over the more general arbitration command of the
FAA.230
Next, the court turned to the McMahon factors to find that the FTC’s inter-
pretation was reasonable. The Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express
Inc. v. McMahon held that the FAA’s arbitration directive “may be overridden
by a contrary congressional command.”231 The McMahon Court suggested
three factors to consider when evaluating a prospective contrary congressional
command. It held that if Congress intended to proscribe arbitration in a particu-
lar statute, its intent would be deducible from (1) the text of the statute, (2) the
statute’s legislative history, or (3) “from an inherent conflict between arbitra-
tion and the statute’s underlying purposes.”232 In a particularly conclusory
222 Id. at 1027–28 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. at 60,211).
223 Id. at 1028 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-1107, at 41).
224 Id. (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274–75 (1974)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
225 Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996)).
226 Id. at 1028–29.
227 Id. at 1029.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
232 Id. at 227. The Fifth Circuit utilized the McMahon factors in the first prong of the
Chevron test to find that Congress had spoken directly to the issue of enforceability of
arbitration clauses. Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2002).
The Eleventh Circuit utilized the McMahon factors in the second prong of the Chevron test
to find that the FTC’s construction of the statute was unreasonable. Davis v. S. Energy
Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
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argument, the Kolev Court found that the MMWA manifested a contrary con-
gressional command sufficient to justify overriding the FAA simply because
the FTC reinterpreted the MMWA in 1999 after McMahon was decided—
though the court did not weigh the McMahon factors and provided no evidence
that the FTC actually considered them.233
The third reason the Kolev Court discarded the claim that the FTC’s inter-
pretation was contrary to Supreme Court precedent was that the MMWA was
“different in four critical respects from every other federal statute that the
Supreme Court” rejected as failing to “rebut the FAA’s pro-arbitration pre-
sumption.”234 First, the court found the MMWA was the only statute wherein
an authorized agency construed the statute to forbid binding arbitration.235 Sec-
ond, only in the MMWA did Congress mention informal, non-judicial remedies
and simultaneously bar any binding procedures.236 Third, in the MMWA, the
court found that Congress explicitly preserved “a consumer’s right to press his
claims under the statute in civil court.”237 Fourth, the court held that the pri-
mary purpose of the MMWA was to protect consumers by proscribing binding,
non-judicial remedies.238 The court stated that the purpose of the FAA was “to
expedite disputes through efficient, dispute-specific procedures and not to
advance the interests of consumers.”239
Thus, the Kolev Court concluded that “written warranty provisions that
mandate pre-dispute binding arbitration are invalid under the MMWA and that
the district court therefore erred in enforcing Porsche’s warranty clause by
compelling mandatory arbitration of Kolev’s claims.”240
C. The Dissenting Opinion in Kolev
In his dissent, Judge Smith argued that the majority was only able to reach
its conclusion by conflating informal dispute Mechanisms with any possible
alternative dispute resolution remedy.241 He contended that FTC regulations for
informal dispute settlement Mechanisms do not apply to binding arbitration
remedies and that the FTC simply prohibited the optional Mechanisms from
being binding.242
233 See Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1030.
234 Id. The court specifically referred to the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the Securities
Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2)(3)(C)). Congress granted the Commission authority to
“prescribe rules setting forth minimum requirements for any informal dispute settlement pro-
cedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty.” Id. (quoting U.S.C.
§ 2310(a)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
237 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(C)). The court supported this proposition with 15
U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(C), which required that a “consumer resort to such [informal dispute
settlement] procedure before pursuing any legal remedy,” and also on 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(a)(3)(C)(i), which stated that “no consumer may ‘commence a civil action . . . unless
he initially resorts to such procedure.’ ” Id. at 1030–31.
238 Id. at 1031.
239 Id. (referencing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)).
240 Id.
241 Id. at 1031–32 (Smith, J., dissenting).
242 Id. at 1032.
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Indeed, the dealership’s warranty did not include any of the requirements
of such a Mechanism.243 The warranty made arbitration a binding alternative to
litigation rather than a prerequisite to litigation, as is required of such a Mecha-
nism.244 Thus, the dealership’s arbitration clause was outside the realm of these
Mechanisms and could not be limited to a non-binding forum.245
Judge Smith pointed to the FTC’s statement that “nothing in the Rule pre-
cludes the parties from agreeing to the use of some avenue of redress other than
the Mechanism if they feel it is more appropriate.”246 Further, the FTC
affirmed that Rule 703, its guideline for Mechanisms, applies only to warran-
tors who incorporate a Mechanism within their written warranties.247 There-
fore, Judge Smith argued, the FTC’s prohibition of binding, non-judicial
remedies was limited to its rules surrounding the statute’s optional Mecha-
nisms, not to any litigation alternative the parties might select.248
Judge Smith then argued that Chevron deference was inappropriate
because Congress did not delegate authority to the FTC regarding dispute reso-
lution outside the MMWA’s Mechanism, and Congress gave courts the author-
ity to enforce claims under the MMWA.249 The only gap in the MMWA that
Congress left for the FTC to fill was limited to “prescrib[ing] rules setting forth
minimum requirements for” Mechanisms.250 The MMWA did not address any
remedies outside of the optional Mechanisms, nor did it imply that the FTC was
granted authority to decide such issues.251
In Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, the Supreme Court declined to extend
Chevron deference to the Department of Labor when it sought to resolve ambi-
guities in the scope of the remedies section of the Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act.252 The Supreme Court stated that although “Congress clearly
envisioned . . . a role for the Department of Labor in administering the statute
by requiring the Secretary to promulgate standards implementing [certain]
AWPA[ ] . . . provisions,” Congress also “established an enforcement scheme
independent of the Executive and provided aggrieved farm workers with direct
recourse to federal court when their rights under the statute are violated.”253
Similarly, Judge Smith wrote, “Congress clearly envisioned a role for the FTC
in ‘administering the statute by requiring the [Commission] to promulgate stan-
dards implementing [the Mechanism] provisions,’ ” but also “established an
enforcement scheme independent of the Executive and provided aggrieved
[consumers] with direct recourse to [state or] federal court where their rights
243 Id. at 1033.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 1034 (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,210 (Dec. 31, 1975)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
247 Id. (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,707 (Apr. 22, 1999)).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 1035.
250 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a) (2006)).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 1035–36 (citing Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990)).
253 Id. at 1036 (citing Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 650) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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under the statute are violated.”254 Judge Smith concluded that the judiciary
owes no deference to the FTC’s interpretation of the legality of extra-judicial
enforcement procedures because Congress expressly established the judiciary
as the adjudicator of rights under the statute.255
Finally, Judge Smith wrote, the FAA established a federal policy favoring
enforcement of arbitration agreements.256 In every case before the Supreme
Court that raised a statutory claim that did not explicitly preclude arbitration,
the Court enforced the presumption of arbitrability under the FAA.257 Congress
passed the FAA to overcome judicial suspicion and hostility toward arbitra-
tion.258 The FAA, therefore, forecloses any hope to find that binding arbitration
conflicts with the MMWA’s purpose of protecting consumers.259 Thus, he
summed up, the majority erred in concluding that the MMWA’s consumer-
friendly policies imply that Congress intended to preclude binding
arbitration.260
Therefore, Judge Smith concluded his dissent: “[t]he FTC’s ban on arbi-
tration cannot reasonably be read to apply to anything other than an MMWA
‘Mechanism.’ ”261
IV. THE FTC’S INTERPRETATION OF THE MMWA APPROPRIATELY
PRECLUDES PRE-DISPUTE BINDING ARBITRATION BUT FOR
REASONS OTHER THAN THOSE PROFFERED BY THE FTC
AND THE COURTS
The FTC was not wrong to limit pre-dispute binding arbitration in warran-
ties through the MMWA. The FTC’s interpretation is plagued, however, by
unclear language and weak reasoning, which likely contributed to the massive
resistance it met in state and federal courts. The courts that upheld the FTC’s
interpretation, including the Ninth Circuit in Kolev, have generally extended
the same line of reasoning. By bolstering that reasoning, the decisions
extending the FTC’s interpretation would have been more compelling. The fol-
lowing sections identify these areas of unclear language and weak reasoning
and suggest alternative arguments that might have been more successful in pre-
serving the FTC’s interpretation and avoiding the conflict among the courts.
A. Improperly Conflating Mechanisms with Any Form of Alternative
Dispute Resolution
In his Kolev dissent, Judge Smith correctly argued that the majority
reached its conclusion by inappropriately conflating “Mechanisms” with any
254 Id. (citing Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 650) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
255 Id.
256 Id. at 1037.
257 Id. at 1037–38.
258 Id. at 1036 (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225–26
(1987)).
259 Id. at 1037.
260 Id. at 1038.
261 Id.
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possible alternative dispute resolution remedy.262 In fact, the majority’s holding
stemmed directly from the FTC’s interpretation that binding arbitration was
forbidden because Congress intended that “Mechanisms not be legally bind-
ing.”263 This reasoning by the FTC has led courts on logical wild goose chases
across the country as judges attempted to justify a total arbitration ban in war-
ranties with only the support that Mechanisms cannot be legally binding.
Judge Smith then argued that the majority had misinterpreted the FTC’s
regulation and that the FTC had not actually intended to prohibit arbitration as
an alternative. Smith reasoned that Mechanisms were merely optional, so a
party could opt to utilize binding arbitration instead of a Mechanism.264 He
pointed to the FTC’s Mechanism regulation that “nothing in the Rule precludes
the parties from agreeing to the use of some avenue of redress other than the
Mechanism if they feel it is more appropriate.”265 The regulations also state,
however, that “reference within the written warranty to any binding, non-judi-
cial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the Act.”266 This statement can only
be reconciled with the continued availability of binding arbitration if it is read
to prohibit pre-dispute binding arbitration. Thus, the FTC’s regulations allow
parties to pursue binding arbitration once a conflict arises, but the regulations
do not allow parties to include binding arbitration beforehand within a written
warranty.267
Judge Smith tried to sweep this apparent prohibition of pre-dispute bind-
ing arbitration under the rug by reasoning that the FTC intended only to limit
the requirements of Mechanisms because the statement was contained in the
section concerning the FTC’s rules for Mechanisms.268 Therefore, he argued,
pre-dispute binding arbitration was a valid alternative to a Mechanism but did
not, itself, qualify as a Mechanism. This argument cannot be sustained, how-
ever, because the regulation clearly prohibits “any binding, non-judicial rem-
edy” in written warranties. And the regulation specifically states that the source
of the prohibition is “the Rule and the Act.” Thus, Judge Smith’s attempt to
limit the FTC’s prohibition under “the Rule” alone is unconvincing.
The only reasonable conclusion from the language of the regulations is
that the FTC intended to forbid pre-dispute binding arbitration. The only con-
gressional support the FTC provided for this prohibition was that Congress
intended that Mechanisms remain non-binding. Mechanisms are expressly
optional, however, so warrantors are not required to abide by Mechanism rules.
262 See id. at 1031–32.
263 Rules, Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations Under Magnusson-Moss Warranty
Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,210 (Dec. 31, 1975) (emphasis added).
264 Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1033–34 (Smith, J., dissenting).
265 Id. at 1034 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. at 60,210).
266 Rules, Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations Under Magnusson-Moss Warranty
Act, 40 Fed. Reg. at 60,211.
267 This point is supported by the FTC’s 1999 Rules and Regulations, where the agency
cited Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1997), as having
“upheld the Commission’s position that the Warranty Act does not intend for warrantors to
include binding arbitration clauses in written warranties on consumer products.” See Final
Action Concerning Review of Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 64 Fed.
Reg. 19,700, 19,708 n.72 (Apr. 22, 1999).
268 Kolev, 658 F.3d at 1034 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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If optional Mechanisms must remain non-binding, any form of alternative dis-
pute resolution then may still be binding; it just will not fit within the definition
of Mechanisms. But, alas, the Ninth Circuit was left to bridge the FTC’s faulty
implication, and it concluded that pre-dispute binding arbitration was disal-
lowed, in part, because it was binding. Aside from this insufficient argument,
the FTC offered one other reason for the prohibition that was equally ineffec-
tual: consumer protection.
B. Improper Method of Consumer Protection
In response to industry comments that MMWA Mechanisms should be
legally binding, the FTC stated that “[t]he Commission is not now convinced
that any guidelines [for a system where consumers would commit to resolving
any future disputes in a non-judicial, binding proceeding, at the time of the
product purchase] could ensure sufficient protection for consumers.”269 Admit-
tedly, the FTC was specifically discussing the legal effect of Mechanisms in
this statement. But the fact that the FTC impliedly conflated Mechanisms with
all potential forms of alternative dispute resolution warrants consideration of
this statement as another reason the FTC chose to prohibit pre-dispute binding
arbitration.
If any one principal can be gleaned from the Supreme Court’s recent arbi-
tration jurisprudence, it is that arbitration clauses cannot be singled out for
treatment different from other, more mundane clauses within a contract.270 The
Supreme Court has adopted a zero tolerance policy for the notion that arbitra-
tion is in any way inferior to litigation.271 This zero tolerance extends to
attempts by courts, state legislatures, and agencies to protect a weaker party
when there is a perceived imbalance of power.272 Although Congress created
the FTC, in large part, to protect consumers,273 it is very unlikely the Supreme
Court would allow the agency’s consumer protection authority to overrule Con-
gress’s specific pronouncement that arbitration agreements cannot be hindered
by hostile sentiments. Therefore, the argument that consumer protection justi-
269 Rules, Regulations, Statements, and Interpretations Under Magnusson-Moss Warranty
Act, 40 Fed. Reg. at 60,210.
270 See, e.g., Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)) (“By enacting § 2, we have several times
said, Congress precluded States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status,
requiring instead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as other
contracts.’ ”).
271 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745–47, 1750, 1753
(2011).
272 See, e.g., id. at 1763 (overruling California’s Discover Bank rule, which permitted a
party to a consumer contract to demand class arbitration ex post even after the party signed a
class waiver, as “preempted by the FAA”); Doctor’s Associates, 517 U.S. at 683 (invalidat-
ing a Montana statute as preempted by the FAA because the legislature wrote the statute to
require an enforceable arbitration clause to be printed on the first page of a contract as well
as to be otherwise conspicuous); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
28–29 (1991) (“the mere involvement of an administrative agency in the enforcement of a
statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration.”).
273 See Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 41–58 (2012)).
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fies a prohibition of binding arbitration, although perhaps a valid normative
argument, is not an effective practical argument.
As a result, courts upholding the FTC’s interpretation were left to their
own devices to either follow the FTC’s unclear language and weak reasoning or
to determine whether another valid justification existed for eliminating pre-dis-
pute binding arbitration from written consumer warranties.
C. Justification for Prohibiting Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration in
Consumer Warranties
In the MMWA, Congress declared its policy “to encourage warrantors to
establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expeditiously
settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms.”274 Notably, Congress
took an undemanding position in this section; it gave warrantors the option of
adopting these Mechanisms without forcing them to do so. Yet Congress pro-
vided certain benefits to induce warrantors to adopt Mechanisms. Thus, it is
clear that Congress stated a preference for these Mechanisms over seeking
some other legal remedy.
In holding that Congress did not intend to preclude binding arbitration
under the MMWA, the Fifth Circuit found that Congress explicitly stated that
Mechanisms would be a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit—and arbitration is gen-
erally considered a substitute.275 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded, a warrantor
that chose not to adopt a Mechanism could still include binding arbitration
agreements in its warranties.276 But, if arbitration is merely an alternative
medium, or a substitute, for seeking a legal remedy, that implies that Con-
gress’s preference for non-binding Mechanisms included a preference over
arbitration as another legal and binding remedy.
Mechanisms essentially act like a mediator/special master over disputes
between a warrantor and consumer. Mechanisms do not require a law-trained
expert277 and do not include formal discovery.278 Mechanisms permit oral
presentations only in limited instances.279 There are no time or cost restraints in
arbitration, whereas a Mechanism must issue a decision within forty days of
notification of the dispute.280 Warrantors have a disincentive to keep arbitration
costs low; high costs discourage consumer actions.281 In Mechanisms, how-
ever, warrantors have an incentive to keep costs low because costs are borne
solely by the warrantor.282 Therefore, Mechanisms are generally more efficient
and less costly. And the Supreme Court used arbitration’s efficiency and cost
274 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (2012).
275 Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 2002).
276 Id. at 479.
277 See 16 C.F.R. § 703.4 (2013).
278 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(c) (the Mechanism itself is responsible for investigating, gathering,
and organizing all necessary information for evaluating the claims and rendering a decision).
279 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(f).
280 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.5(d)–(e).
281 Indeed, “[t]he costs of arbitration can be so high that they deny consumers access to a
forum in which to air their disputes.” Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Con-
sumer Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 161 (2004).
282 See 16 C.F.R. § 703.3(a).
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effectiveness to fuel, at least in part, its evolving interpretation and preference
for arbitration over litigation.283
Since Congress made Mechanisms optional, it created incentives for war-
rantors to employ them. For warrantors that implement a Mechanism according
to both the MMWA and the FTC’s more specific Mechanism rules, a “con-
sumer may not commence a civil action . . . unless he initially resorts to such
procedure.”284 Furthermore, the named plaintiffs in a class action “may not
proceed in a class action . . . unless [they] . . . initially resort to such proce-
dure.”285 Thus, Congress sought to encourage Mechanism use by rewarding
warrantors for implementing them. In the FAA, Congress simply empowered
arbitration clauses. In the MMWA, Congress empowered Mechanisms but also
created incentives to implement them. Congress did not provide such encour-
agement to implement arbitration proceedings. Therefore, it may be stated that
Congress expressed its preference for Mechanisms over arbitration.
For warrantors, the benefits of binding arbitration swallow the benefits of
Mechanisms, thereby eliminating any incentive Congress created to encourage
the use of Mechanisms. Binding arbitration clauses preclude civil actions rather
than making complainants resort first to that particular forum. And, as dis-
cussed above, the Supreme Court, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Interna-
tional Corp., held that a complainant may not be granted class status without an
explicit provision for resolution of class disputes within an arbitration agree-
ment.286 Accordingly, arbitration clauses effectively eliminate class actions
altogether.287
Congress could not have intended to create ineffectual incentives for
employing Mechanisms. The canons of statutory construction require that an
interpretation be made in a manner that gives force and effect to all sections of
the statute. An interpretation rendering parts of a statute moot is disfavored to
interpretations that give effect to all parts.288 Arbitration renders the incentives
to implement Mechanisms moot. Congress would not have created the Mecha-
nism incentives if it did not intend them to have effect.
Note, again, that the FTC did not have authority to prohibit pre-dispute
binding arbitration for the sake of protecting consumers from the process of
pre-dispute binding arbitration; the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
arbitration cannot be treated with such mistrust and hostility. The FTC’s pro-
scriptive authority, therefore, comes from Congress’s delegation to make rules
for Mechanism procedures289 and to supplement the statute’s protections.290
Mechanisms—and the incentives to implement them—act as part of the stat-
ute’s protections. To be clear, the statute’s protections are the affirmative
implements of the MMWA, not protection from arbitration. So, the FTC had
283 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011).
284 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (2012).
285 Id.
286 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
287 It is reasonable to conclude that the more powerful and sophisticated party will omit any
provision for resolution of class disputes within their arbitration agreements. See Concep-
cion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51 (2011).
288 Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991).
289 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2).
290 Id. § 2309(b).
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authority to act in a manner that would preserve the implements of the
MMWA. Since pre-dispute binding arbitration eliminates any benefit Congress
extended to encourage the use of Mechanisms, the FTC had authority to pro-
scribe pre-dispute binding arbitration.
Likely foreseeing that warrantors would not adopt Mechanisms without a
valid reason to do so, the FTC precluded pre-dispute binding arbitration in war-
ranties upon passage of the MMWA. With many courts either overlooking or
refusing to enforce this regulation, warrantors continued to include arbitration
clauses in their warranties. Indeed, when the FTC revisited its MMWA Rules
and Regulations in 1999, it noted that “few warrantors incorporate [Mecha-
nisms] into their warranties.”291
Therefore, the FTC had valid reasons to prohibit pre-dispute binding arbi-
tration in warranties; the FTC did not need to use consumer protection from
arbitration as its reason and could have avoided conflating Mechanisms with all
other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Congress demonstrated a prefer-
ence for Mechanisms over seeking a legal remedy. Congress also created incen-
tives to employ Mechanisms, and those incentives must be given force and
effect. Of course, Congress had to appropriately delegate authority to the FTC
to extend these policy goals. This delegation is considered next.
D. Delegated Authority
Congress granted the FTC authority to “prescribe rules setting forth mini-
mum requirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure which is
incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision of this
chapter applies.”292 This was the only clause cited by courts as granting the
FTC authority to preclude binding arbitration in warranties. The clause may be
enough to justify regulations outside of Mechanism procedures to appropriately
set the stage for implementation. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent arbitra-
tion jurisprudence, however, the FTC likely needs additional support to over-
come the Court’s strong preference for arbitration.
The FTC can find this MMWA “necessary and proper” clause at 15
U.S.C. § 2309(b). The clause states that the FTC “to the extent necessary to
supplement the protections offered the consumer by this chapter, shall prescribe
rules dealing with such warranties and practices.”293 As discussed above, the
FTC cannot cast aside arbitration under the guise of consumer protection. How-
ever, it can, “to the extent necessary to supplement the protections” of the
MMWA, make rules concerning warranties and warrantor practices.294 Further-
more, Congress included a clause that “[t]he Commission shall promulgate
rules for initial implementation of this chapter as soon as possible after January
4, 1975 . . . .”295
In conclusion, because the FTC had authority “to the extent necessary to
supplement the protections” of the MMWA, it had the authority to adopt
291 Final Action Concerning Review of Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
64 Fed. Reg. 19,700, 19,707 (Apr. 22, 1999).
292 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2).
293 Id. § 2309(b).
294 See id. (emphasis added).
295 Id. § 2312(c).
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requirements outside Mechanism rules to ensure Congress’s protections were
implemented. When Congress passed the MMWA to protect consumers, it cre-
ated Mechanisms so consumer disputes could be settled “fairly and expedi-
tiously.” Had Congress omitted the section creating Mechanisms, its intended
consumer protections would be lessened. If Congress’s incentives for warran-
tors to employ Mechanisms are rendered ineffectual, as they are by allowing
pre-dispute binding arbitration, then warrantors will not utilize Mechanisms. If
warrantors do not utilize Mechanisms, the section creating Mechanisms is use-
less and effectively omitted. Thus, Congress’s intended consumer protections
are diminished by failing to give force and effect to Mechanism incentives. The
FTC could not, itself, protect consumers from arbitration, but it could protect
consumers in ways Congress deemed necessary. The FTC merely set the stage
for Mechanism use by finding that the MMWA precluded binding arbitration.
Thus, the FTC did not go beyond “the extent necessary to supplement the pro-
tections” of the statute.
E. Chevron Analysis
Courts evaluating the FTC’s MMWA regulations have performed Chev-
ron analyses to determine whether the court should grant the FTC deference.
Within their Chevron analyses, the federal courts of appeals evaluated the fac-
tors developed in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon to determine
whether Congress expressed a contrary congressional command sufficient to
override Congress’s FAA arbitration directive. Again, the McMahon Court
held that Congress’s command would be deducible from the text of the statute
in question, the statute’s legislative history, or “from an inherent conflict
between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.”296
Courts have evaluated the McMahon factors under either of the Chevron
prongs. The Fifth Circuit applied the McMahon factor analysis under the first
prong of the Chevron test.297 The evaluation was likely applied in that manner
because the first prong of Chevron—whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue—sounds substantially similar to the purpose of the
McMahon analysis—to determine whether Congress expressed a contrary com-
mand sufficient to override the FAA. The Fifth Circuit concluded its decision
after the first Chevron prong, finding that Congress had spoken directly to the
issue of enforceability of arbitration clauses.298
Although it ultimately reached the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit,
the Eleventh Circuit considered the McMahon factors under the second prong
of the Chevron test.299 It likely did so because the McMahon factors—statutory
text, legislative history, and the statute’s purpose—are the types of factors a
court would consider when evaluating whether an agency’s construction is rea-
sonable rather than if the construction directly answers a precise question. The
Eleventh Circuit found that Congress had not directly spoken to the precise
question at issue and then concluded that the FTC’s interpretation of the statute
296 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
297 Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 478 & n.14 (5th Cir. 2002).
298 Id.
299 Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
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was unreasonable based on the McMahon factors.300 Like the Eleventh Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit considered the McMahon factors under the second prong of
Chevron.301
The McMahon factors are more reasonably evaluated in the second prong
of the Chevron test. The outcome of evaluating the text, the legislative history,
and an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s purpose speaks
more to the reasonability of an interpretation rather than answering a specific
question. “Directly” speaking to a precise question implies a certain level of
clarity and obviousness. If Congress directly spoke to a precise question, there
would be no need to consider anything beyond the black letter of the law. A
look at congressional intent and the underlying policy rationale simply fits bet-
ter in determining whether an interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Fur-
thermore, the McMahon analysis provides a test for whether the FTC’s
construction is permissible. If a court used the McMahon analysis to determine
whether Congress directly spoke to the precise question, the court would also
likely look to those same factors to evaluate the second prong of Chevron,
thereby merging Chevron’s two steps into one. Therefore, it is more appropri-
ate to consider whether the MMWA expressed a contrary congressional com-
mand sufficient to override the FAA in the second prong of Chevron.
1. Congress Has Not Directly Spoken to the Precise Question at Issue
As stated above, the precise question at issue is whether binding arbitra-
tion may be precluded from consumer warranties. The FAA was a general
directive passed to overcome prior judicial hostility toward arbitration. The
blanket requirements of the FAA may be read to apply to all questions of arbi-
trability unless Congress appears to carve out a more recent, more specific
exception.302 Assuming the statute creates ambiguity justifying Chevron analy-
sis, as it does here, the question of arbitrability of warranty claims under the
MMWA is both more specific and more recent than the blanket FAA. Thus,
Congress has not answered the present precise question at issue. Therefore, the
analysis continues to the second prong of Chevron: whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
2. The FTC’s Answer Is Based on a Permissible Construction of the
Statute
Congress must have granted implicit authority for the FTC to prohibit
binding arbitration because Congress did not explicitly speak to the question at
issue.303 Congress authorized the FTC to make rules “to the extent necessary to
supplement the protections” of the MMWA.304 As established above, this
authority incorporates questions of staging, including giving force and effect to
300 Id.
301 See Kolev v. Euromotors W./Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024, 1026–27, 1029 (9th Cir.
2011), opinion withdrawn, 676 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012).
302 See id. at 1029.
303 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984).
304 15 U.S.C. § 2309(b) (2012).
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the incentives Congress expressly implemented in the MMWA. Thus, Congress
implicitly granted authority to the FTC to promulgate such rules.
When Congress has granted an agency implicit authority, courts “may not
substitute [their] own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”305 Therefore, the
FTC’s interpretation precluding binding arbitration need only be a reasonable
interpretation to survive. The McMahon factors provide the most appropriate
evaluation of a permissible construction for the current question at issue.
The Supreme Court has held that the FAA establishes a strong presump-
tion in favor of the enforceability of arbitration agreements.306 Only a contrary
congressional command can override the dictates of the FAA.307 The McMa-
hon Court held that such a contrary congressional command would be deduci-
ble from (1) the text of the statute in question, (2) the statute’s legislative
history, or (3) “from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s
underlying purposes.”308
The text of the MMWA weighs in favor of affirming the FTC’s interpreta-
tion, although it does not explicitly mention binding arbitration. The text cre-
ates Mechanisms to “fairly and expeditiously” settle consumer warranty
disputes.309 Congress crafted Mechanisms as an efficient and cost-effective
prerequisite to seeking a legal remedy.310 The Supreme Court has found a pref-
erence for arbitration over litigation, in large part, due to the improved effi-
ciency and cost-effectiveness of the process. And Mechanisms are more
efficient and cost-effective than arbitration. Furthermore, Congress granted
incentives to encourage Mechanism use, implying a preference over alterna-
tives.311 Therefore, it follows that Congress preferred Mechanisms over
arbitration.
Congress could not have intended to create ineffectual incentives for
employing Mechanisms. There was no other reason to provide such incentives
if Congress did not intend their use. To give these express congressional incen-
tives effect, it was necessary to preclude binding arbitration in written warran-
ties under the MMWA.
The legislative history of the MMWA is not as helpful here. Since Con-
gress did not consider binding arbitration, there was no discussion of binding
arbitration in the legislative history. Although the absence of any arbitration
discussion tends to weigh in favor of overturning the FTC’s interpretation,
there is also nothing in the legislative history that affirmatively hurts the FTC’s
position.
The final McMahon factor weighs in favor of the FTC’s interpretation.
Pre-dispute binding arbitration inherently conflicts with the MMWA’s pur-
poses. The stated purposes of the MMWA include “improv[ing] the adequacy
of information available to consumers, prevent[ing] deception, and improv[ing]
305 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
306 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).
307 Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
308 Id. at 226–27.
309 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (2012).
310 Id. § 2310(a)(3)(C).
311 Id.
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competition in the marketing of consumer products.”312 Although these pur-
poses do not necessarily conflict with arbitration, Congress created Mecha-
nisms as a tactic to achieve these ends and to improve the remedial process
under the MMWA. Furthermore, Congress stated its policy “to encourage war-
rantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expe-
ditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms.”313 By
eliminating Congress’s incentives to encourage Mechanism use, pre-dispute
binding arbitration effectively eliminates Mechanisms. And eliminating Mecha-
nisms cuts directly against Congress’s goal of “encourag[ing] warrantors to
establish” Mechanisms.
Based on a review of the McMahon factors, it appears the FTC’s construc-
tion of the MMWA is permissible. The text of the MMWA and arbitration’s
inherent conflict with the statute weigh heavily in favor of affirming the FTC’s
interpretation. The legislative history of the statute—by failing to mention
binding arbitration—weighs only slightly against the interpretation.
In conclusion, the Chevron test, with the substituted arguments, would
likely support the FTC’s interpretation of the MMWA. Congress did not
directly speak to the issue of binding arbitration in consumer warranties, and
the FTC’s construction is permissible in consideration of the McMahon factors
for overriding the policy of the FAA.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gal-
lery correctly affirmed the FTC’s interpretation prohibiting pre-dispute binding
arbitration in written warranties. The reasoning the Ninth Circuit used to arrive
at that conclusion, however, was incorrect. The court based much of its reason-
ing on the FTC’s regulations. The FTC could have avoided legal challenges to
the arbitration prohibition by altering its unclear language and weak reasoning
in support of the prohibition. The courts that supported the FTC’s interpretation
have been hampered by this unclear language and weak reasoning as well.
The FTC (and courts) improperly conflated informal dispute settlement
mechanisms with any possible alternative dispute resolution remedy. The
MMWA clearly makes such Mechanisms optional, so the FTC could not rea-
sonably justify the arbitration prohibition by using congressional intent to make
Mechanisms non-binding. The FTC (and courts) also improperly reasoned that
binding arbitration could be prohibited to protect consumers. The Supreme
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence makes it clear that arbitration cannot be
treated with suspicion or hostility. Therefore, the FTC required some justifica-
tion for prohibiting arbitration other than what it proffered.
This Note provides that justification by arguing that arbitration renders
Mechanisms under the MMWA ineffectual. Congress provided incentives to
warrantors that adopt Mechanisms. The benefits afforded to warrantors in pre-
dispute binding arbitration swallow the benefits of Mechanisms, thereby negat-
ing any encouragement Congress attempted to provide. Congress could not
312 Id. § 2302(a).
313 Id. § 2310(a)(1).
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have intended the Mechanism section of the MMWA to be without force or
effect. Therefore, the FTC properly precluded binding arbitration in warranties
because it implemented Congress’s intent.
Although the Ninth Circuit panel in Kolev withdrew its opinion and
avoided the circuit split, courts that consider the issue in the future should find
success upholding the FTC’s interpretation by bolstering their opinions with the
arguments outlined herein.
